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INTERPRETATION OF INTERPERSONAL UTILITY COMPARISONS: POSmvE, NORMATIVE OR DESCRIPTIVE

John B. Davis

Marquette University
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Abstract
While interpersonal utility comparisons are indispensable to the
determination of utility maxima, their interpretation as either normative or positive produces awkward conclusions.
This paper alternatively reinterprets interpersonal utility comparisons
as descriptive and value-laden rather than as either normative of
positive. On this basis they are characterized as functional concepts,
and are thus argued to be objective. This treatment suggests that it is
possible to derive evaluative statements from descriptive ones, contrary
to the usual view of the is-ought problem. Recent philosophy of
language results are employed to support these views.

1. Introduction
Since Musgrave (1959) it has been conventional to separate government activity into allocation and redistdbution decisions, a distinction that also traditionally divides positive and normative public
choice (Mueller, 1979, p.263). The difference between choices that
benefit all members of the community and those that benefits some
at the expense of others corresponds to the difference between
moves to the Pareto frontier and moves along it. In normative
public choice theory, social welfare functions, deriving originally
from Bergson (1938) and especially Samuelson (1947), have
embodied this distinction for
W = W(Ul , UlJ ..•, Un)
where W is a real-valued function and the Vi are individual utility
indexes, by requiring the Pareto principles as a necessary condition
for maximization of W such that the familiar efficiency conditions
apply. The individual utility indexes have generally been assumed to
73
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be ordinal, particularly since Robbins' critique (1937) of cardinal
interpersonal utility comparisons as normative.
However it has been shown that the Bergson-Samuelson social
welfare function defined over ordinal utility indexes must be dictatorial if it is to select a single outcome consistently (Kemp and Ng,
1976; Parks, 1976). The Kemp-Ng impossibility theorem parallels
Arrow's original impossibility theorem for axiomatic public choice,
both in terms of the general structure of the proof and in intent. 1
In effect, without information about the intensity of preferences the
Paretian social welfare function is insufficiently rich for a consistent
non-:dictorial determination of a best point on the Pareto frontier,
and thus inadequate for the identification of a utility maximum over
both allocation and redistributive decisions. Yet this does not imply
that social welfare function framework must be abandoned. Accepting Robbins' view that interpersonal utility comparisons are nonnative, Kemp-Ng state that
'it remains open to any individual to play the role of
ethical observer, prepared to engage in interpersonal
comparisons of cardinal individual welfares .
to produce a social welfare function (Kemp and Ng, 1976, p.65).
Yet this presents problems for the social welfare function tradition
of normative public choice theory. If the individual utility indexes
that are arguments in the social welfare function are both cardinal
and interpersonally comparable, then the conventional distinction
between presumably uncontroversial allocation decisions and the
more intractable redistribution ones is undermined, since the Pareto
frontier ceases to have meaning in this framework. Indeed, because
the traditional division between positive and nonnative theory
depends upon a descriptive non-normative judgments concerning a
social welfare maximum, the very character of economics as a
discipline that distinguishes explanation and recommendation is
itself jeopardized. Nor is it by any means clear that an alternative
foundation of comparable force and objectivity is available to
economics in the normative cardinal framework, since as noted by
Pattanaik (1968) and Sen (1970), should individual ethical observers
differ in their ethical preferences, then Arrow's problem of obtaining a social ranking from divergent individual rankings may prelude
any determinate results whatsoever.
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Alternatively, were Robbins mistaken that interpersonal utility
comparisons are normative, a distinct, perhaps more subtle difficulty
arises. Philosophers since Hume have argued that "ought' cannot
be inferred from "is', that is, that evaluative statements cannot be
inferred from positive ones. Thus, should comparison of individuals'
cardinal utility indexes be characterizable in positive, non-normative
terms, then the maximization of W, a normative judgment that social
welfare ought to be at a maximum, would represent the attempt to
derive an evaluative statement from positive ones based on interpersonal comparisons of utility. On logical grounds, then, such judgments could never be justified, and the Kemp-Ng results would in
fact preclude inferring the desirability of a utility maximum, though
not is virtue of the rationale of their impossibility theorem.
The dilemma for social welfare function analysis, then, is that while
interpersonal utility comparison are indispensable to the determination of a utility maximum, their interpretation as either normative or
positive produces conclusions which are unacceptable. This paper
attempts to resolve this dilemma by reinterpreting these latter
alternatives. That is, interpersonal utility comparisons are said to be
neither normative nor positive, but descriptive and value-laden. As
such, they are non-normative in that they do not involve the use of
facts to evaluate social arrangements in terms of the traditional
normative concerns of welfare, justice, or fairness. At the same
time, they are non-positive in that they presuppose (non-normative)
values.
The following section of this paper critically examines Robbins' view
(1933, 1937) that interpersonal utility comparisons are normative. It
is argued that it remains to be shown that interpersonal utility
comparisons are normative. The succeeding section characterizes
the way in which evaluative statements can be derived from "is'.
Interpersonal utility comparisons are shown to be embodied in
descriptive statements. The final section argues that these descriptive statements are objective, despite being value-laden, thus justifying the use of interpersonal utility comparisons in economics for
social welfare function analysis, while at the same time restoring the
distinction in the discipline between explanation and recommendation.
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2. Robbins' View of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons

I
t
i

In the last chapter of his influential An Essay on the Nature and
Significance of Economic Science (1937) Robbins criticizes the
cardinalist law of diminishing marginal utility, particularly in its
application to income transfers from the rich to the poor. In his
view, though the argument for such transfers appears initially
plausible, in fact, because its assumptions 'can never be verified by
observation or introspection' , it 'begs the great metaphysical
question of the scientific comparability of different individual
experiences'. Indeed since there is nothing problematic in comparing or ordering a number of alternatives an individual encounters,
nor in comparing one individual's orderings with those of others, the
theory of exchange should avoid cardinal interpersonal utility
comparisons. To do otherwise is to admit 'an element of conventional valuation' to the theory that renders it 'essentially normative' (Robbins, 1937, p.139).
Interpersonal utility comparisons, then, are non-scientific and
normative, because they possess 'an element of conventional
evaluation', For Robbins,
'the very diversity of the assumptions actually made at
different times and in different times and in different
places (in making interpersonal comparisons) is evidence
of their conventional nature" (Robbins, 1937, p.140).
Yet though such assumptions are convenient and intrinsic to the
daily practice of making interpersonal comparisons, it is not possible
to demonstrate that these assumptions rest in any way 'on ascertainable fact' . And, if interpersonal comparisons are basically
justified
'on grounds of general convenience [••. or ••.] by appeal to
ultimate standards of obligation [... they] cannot be justified by any kind of positive science" (Robbins, 1937,
p.141).
Granted, then, that interpersonal utility comparisons do rest upon
'an element of conventional evaluation," that is, that they are
value-laden or incorporate assumptions that cannot be justified
factually, it still does not follow that they are specifically normative.
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Values and value judgments are diverse in character, ranging across
a variety of non-normative forms in even scientific argument: e.g.,
whether an inference is valid is a value judgment, whether Ockham's
razor should be employed is a value judgment, that an elegant and
concise proof is preferred to one not so, etc.. Normative value
judgments, however, are of a specific nature. They represent to use
facts in a particular sort of evaluation of social arrangements or
decisions, namely, to draw specific conclusions about social welfare,
justice, fairness, etc. Thus, it remains to be shown that the valueladen nature of interpersonal utility comparisons implies these
comparisons are normative. Indeed., Robbins does not explicitly
argue that this is the case, but rather seems to suggest sometimes
that being value-laden is tantamount to being normative, and other
times that interpersonal comparisons are simply objectionable
whether value-laden or normative.
Indeed, it seems that what is most objectionable about interpersonal
utility comparisons for Robbins is their lack of scientific status. That
they can vary across time and place implies that they are not objective as presumably are scientific statements. Thus the determination
of an individual's sense of satisfaction must rely on observation and
interpretation of behavior or introspection. Yet reports of each of
these is not susceptible to verification. That in everyday life individuals make interpersonal utility comparisons by adopting conventions
of interpretation at best, then, only demonstrates the non-objective
nature of these comparisons.
This view seems more central to Robbins' thinking. It is the subject
of the discussion in the final section below. It is fair to say at this
point, however, that though Robbins is generally taken to shown
interpersonal utility comparisons to be normative, he in fact does
not make this case. This is significant, because most of the recent
research on interpersonal utility comparisons assumes that they are
indeed so, and because, as argued above, such an assumption ultimately jeopardizes the distinction between explanation and recommendation in economics.2 Thus, since this paper will argue that
interpersonal utility comparisons are descriptive, that is value-laden
but not normative, it is appropriate to first consider how interpersonal utility comparisons permit inferring 'ought· from 'is·, so as
to avoid the second hom of the dilemma characterized above.
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3. How to derive 'ought" from 'is"
Mueller (1979) inadvertently captures the difficulty associated with
inferring 'ought" from 'is" in his suggested response to Hume:
'As David Hume pointed long ago, propositions concerning values cannot be derived from factual observations
alone. Some intuitive conceptualization of right and wrong,
of acceptable and unacceptable is required. Thus, efforts to
introduce values into collective choice in a nonarbitrary
way become a search for a community's shared notions of
justice and morality" (Mueller, 1979, p.265).
That" is since one cannot move logically from purely factual propositions to evaluative ones, it is necessary to introduce values in an
'intuitive fashion," that is, by consulting one's sense of a community's shared values, with out attempting to base this intuition upon
any factual characterization of that community. Yet, it is notorious
that one individual's notion of what is shared differs from that of
other individuals. Thus an 'intuitive" grasp of shared values can
hardly be counted on to be 'nonarbitrary", such that the transition
from purely factual propositions to evaluate ones appears insurmountable as Hume claimed.
Closer attention to the logical principle Hume relies upon, however,
reveals the way in which evaluative propositions can indeed be
derived from factual ones. Generally, there cannot be anything in
the conclusion of an inference that is not contained in its premisses.
More specifically, unless an inference's premises themselves contain
elements of evaluation, it is not possible to draw a conclusion that is
itself evaluative in nature. Thus, an evaluative proposition can
indeed be derived from a factual one when, in some manner, the
factual proposition implicitly contains evaluative elements or is not
purely factual. In fact, this sort of inference is more common that is
customarily believed. Specifically, though the factual proposition in
an inference often appears purely positive and value-free, in many
cases the descriptive language of the proposition is value-laden. In
such instances it is not inappropriate to infer an evaluative proposition from a factual one, and indeed this is a legitimate way in which
normative judgments may drawn from description.
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This is best demonstrated by an example. The following inference
employs one factual proposition as the premise for an evaluative
proposition:
(1) Smith is an airline pilot.
(2) Except under unusual circumstances, Smith, as airline pilot
ought not crash the plane Smith pilots.
As in many similar examples that could be constructed, the conclusions follows legitimately from the premise, because the conclusion follows legitimately from the premises, because the premise
presupposes an additional premise that justifies inferring the conclusion:
(1.1) Except under unusual circumstances, being an airline
pilot means ought not crash the plane one pilots.
Thus, the inference is valid, because the conclusion contains nothing
not present in the premises, once (1.1) is identified as implicit in or
presupposed by (1). Yet (1) is a factual proposition, and (2) is an
evaluative one, such that 'ought" is derived from 'is".
Nor are examples of the sort above exceptional or unusual. The
inference above merely makes use of a descriptive concept (airline
pilot) that is functional. Functional concepts are those concepts that
characterize things designed for or put to some purpose by characterizing good instances of those things or how those things ought to
function. Thus (1) characterizes airline pilots by saying what an
individual ought to do to be an airline pilot or what a good airline
pilot is. In this sense airline pilot is an functional concept which is
both descriptive and value-laden. The employment of such concepts
permits inferring evaluative propositions from factual ones when the
latter embody the evaluative propositions that characterize these
concepts. Thus, though it appears Hume's law is violated, in fact it
is not, since, as in the example above, an evaluative proposition is
not derived from a purely positive one, though it is derived from a
factual one.
Economics, as other social sciences, makes considerable use of
functional concepts. In the present connection, the concept of an
interpersonal utility comparison is functional Thus, one characterizes an interpersonal utility comparison by characterizing what a
good interpersonal utility comparison requires or what an interper-
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sonal utility comparison ought to accomplish, that is, one which
impartially and accurately compares the respective utilities from
some choice or action of different individuals with the determination of a utility maximum in mind.3 Accordingly, the employment of
interpersonal utility comparisons permits one to infer evaluative
propositions from factual ones, in the manner of the example above.
Thus:
(1) The transfer of commodity x from Smith to Jones increases
total utility by adding more to Jones' utility than is derived from
Smith's.
(2) Commodity x ought to be transferred from Smith to Jones.
This inference, as the one above, is valid once the premise implicit
in (1), the interpersonal utility comparison, is identified.
Thus: (1.1) Transfers of commodities that increases total utility by
adding more one to individual's utility more than is subtracted from
another's ought to be effected.
The premise implicit in (1) tells us that the idea of an interpersonal
utility comparison includes the recommendation to carry out total
utility increasing transfers. Indeed, interpersonal are made solely
with the intention of making transfers that increase total utility. Yet
(1) itself merely describes the effect on total utility of a particular
commodity transfer, so that again, an evaluative proposition (2) is
derived from a factual one (1), or 'ought' is derived from 'is'.
What the example immediately above demonstrates, then, is that
once the concept of an interpersonal utility comparison is understood to be functional it is possible to surmount the second hom of
the dilemma confronting social welfare function analysis. Functional
concepts are descriptive in the sense of being value-laden, though
they are not thereby normative. Thus, given the Kemp-Ng impossibility theorem demonstrating the necessity of preference intensity
information for determining utility maximization, the interpersonal
utility comparisons permit evaluative conclusions - normative
judgments - that both preserve the distinction between explanation
and recommendation in economics and avoid violation of Hume's
law.
Of course, though the inference above is valid, many would object
that either interpersonal utility comparisons cannot be made, or
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they cannot be made without making normative judgments. Thus,
while there may well be many functional concepts in economics that
permit inferring evaluative propositions from factual ones, the
concept of an interpersonal utility comparison, many would assert,
does not fall within this group. Put differently, Robbins' objection to
such comparisons deserves reexamination to determine whether
interpersonal utility comparisons are indeed descriptive in the
manner suggested.
4. The objectivity of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
Sen (1979) surveys descriptive and normative interpretations of
interpersonal utility comparisons without judging the plausibility of
either interpretation. Yet for the most part, the burden of argument
has rested with those who claim that such comparisons are descriptive in the sense of being fully positive, since the very suggestion
that certain solutions to the problems associated with the comparison of different individuals' interests produce reasonable results
when the social welfare maximum is explained itself at the very least
suggests that the purported descriptive characterizations of individuals' interests are ultimately normative. In effect, a reasonable
account of determining the social welfare maximum, so that those
intent upon describing the social welfare maximum, so that those
intent upon describing how comparisons of individuals' interests are
actually made in fact find themselves charged with prescnoing how
such comparisons ought to be made.
One of the more notable attempts to provide a descriptive and fully
positive characterization of interpersonal utility comparisons
founders on precisely this problem. Harsanyi (1955) claims in his
influential treatment of the social welfare function that
'interpersonal comparisons of utility are not value judgments based on some ethical or political postulates but
rather factual propositions based on certain principles of
inductive logic' (Harsanyi, 1955, p.282).
Harsanyi distinguishes an individual's personal preferences from that
individual's moral of social preferences, requires that both sets
satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstem-Marschak: axioms of choice,

82

JOURNAL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION

and argues that the social welfare function is a weighted sum of the
individual utilities. Yet use of the von Neumann-MorgensternMarschak axioms introduces an element of arbitrariness into the
analysis of cardinal utility, because the impartial observer responsible for assigning a set of weights to be attached to the positions of
each individual in the determination of a social welfare maximum
cannot but reflect a particular preference for risk (Pattanaik, 1968;
Sen, 1970). Thus, though Harsanyi conceives the impartial observer
as having an equal probability of being in the position of each of the
n individuals in the alternative conceptions of society ranked
according to their expected utilities, the impartial observer still
exercises a particular taste for the risk of being in any such position.
Harsanyi, accordingly, must ultimately recommend his account by
emphasizing the impartiality that ought to obtain in the observer's
assessment of each individual's subjective utility levels in different
social states. That is, he must argue that his analysis produces a
reasonable account of the social welfare maximum in the sense of
being fair and impartial. This undermines his own claim to a fully
positive, non-normative characterization of interpersonal utility
comparisons, since values and seemingly normative judgments are
implicit in this emphasis on impartiality.4
Difficulties such as Harsanyi's, however, point toward a strategy in
any interpretation of interpersonal utility comparisons as descriptive
and non-normative. The essential problem with many such attempts
is that their authors assume that a descriptive characterization of
interpersonal utility comparisons must be fully positive, despite the
fact that the concept of an interpersonal utility comparison in
relation to the determination of an social welfare maximum is
clearly functional and thus value-laden. Accordingly, critics cannot
but suspect that purported positive characterizations of interpersonal utility comparisons that are ostensibly value-laden have been
formulated with an eye to particular subsequent normative results,
though their authors may well be chiefly motivated by questions that
concern a good characterization of interpersonal utility comparisons
in the functional rather than normative sense of the term.
The serious issue, then, is whether one can in fact distinguish a
descriptive account of interpersonal utility comparisons that is
simply value-laden in the functional sense from one that is indeed
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ultimately normative though formulated in descriptive language. The
criterion for making such a distinction seems to rest in the distinction between kinds of value. Values functional to a given concept
must be non-discretionary in that they are tied to the very definition
of that concept. They cannot be the subject of choice in the case of
any concept whose definition is generally agreed upon. Thus, to say
what an interpersonal utility comparison is amounts to saying what a
good interpersonal utility comparison is, such that the very meaning
of the concept determines the way in which it is value-laden.
Accordingly, if it can be said that the author of a proposed descriptive account of interpersonal utility comparisons had discretion over
which values are incorporated in that account, then it seems that
one must conclude that the characterization of interpersonal comparisons in question has been formulated with an eye to subsequent
normative judgments. A normative conception of interpersonal
utility comparisons would, on the basis of this criterion, be appropriately regarded as subjective in the specific sense that its content is
discretionary. In contrast, if the values implicit in the concept are
non-discretionary in the sense above, then the account of interpersonal utility comparisons is descriptive, though value-laden, and thus
provides an objective basis for subsequent normative judgments
regarding a social welfare maximum. This objective basis, moreover,
would permit an inference from descriptive propositions to evaluative ones, thus laying a foundation for normative judgment in
economics that preserves the distinction between explanation and
recommendation.
That one can look upon the values implicit in interpersonal utility
comparisons in this way is suggested by the understanding of interpersonal comparisons present in recent, influential philosophy of
language theories of the interpretation of meaning. S In these
theories, the interpretation of another's meaning - whatever the
subject matter of the statements interpreted - can be said to be
objective in the specific sense that the interpretation of another's
meaning, though a value-laden enterprise, is neither consciously nor
unconsciously carried out with an eye to any subsequent judgments
whatsoever. Interpretation of another's meaning, of course is
precisely what is involved in interpersonal utility comparisons, since
they would presuppose that one can determine, largely in terms of
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other's reports, the relation between the intensity of their tastes and
the statements they make about those tastes. Thus, in the words of
one proponent of these views,
'interpersonal have a basis in the sense that in the process
of attributing propositional attitudes like beliefs, desires,
and preferences to others interpersonal are necessarily
made' (Davidson, 1986, p.203).
That is, the day-to-day attribution of various propositional attitudes
(x's belief that such and such, x's desire that such and such, etc.)
involves the interpretation of others' meanings in a fashion that
presupPQses an objective basis for these attnbutions in individuals'
ability to make interpersonal comparisons. Indeed, that such comparisons are 'necessarily' made implies, on this view, that the basis
on which interpersonal comparisons are made is neither consciously
nor unconsciously determined, and thus cannot be said to be discretionary in the subjective sense of having been proposed with an eye
to particular, subsequent normative judgments.
The philosophical theories of meaning interpretation in question
stem from Quine's (1951) arguments that sameness of meaning, or
synonymy, is not linguistically transparent. Sameness of meaning is
empirically determined in that one individual's interpretation of
another individual's sentences must ultimately depend upon the
experience of the former in querying the latter's assent and dissent
regarding the latter's meaning (Quine, 1960; 1976). An individual's
meaning is thus not some mental phenomenon that might be identified apart from what the evidence of those queries would support,
and accordingly, if it can indeed be said that individuals can successfully interpret one anothers' meanings, then they must have done so
by making successful interpersonal comparisons in the process.
Most importantly, in the absence of any mentalistic meaning entities
to anchor interpretation, a certain 'indeterminacy of translation' is
clearly inescapable in any interpreter's account of another's meaning
(Quine, 1989). This inevitable indeterminacy of interpretation whether in the attribution of beliefs, desires, or preferences to
others - makes it necessary to understand interpretation within
framework of standards, values, and assumptions that are functional
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to successful interpretation of others' meaning. At the same time,
that this framework is indispensable in the determination any of
meaning whatsoever implies that the values implicit in interpretation
of another's meaning are not the subject of choice, but are constitutive of an individual's interpretation of other's meanings.
This is perhaps clearest in the explanation of an interpreter's
attribution of a particular belief to some individual on the basis of
that's individual's assertions. Generally, the attribution of a belief to
another is made against a background of assumptions concerning
that individual's other beliefs, desires, and intentions (Davidson,
1986, pp.203-206). This assessment necessarily makes use of the
interpreter's own standards of consistency and of what is valuable,
though the successful attribution of a belief to another depends
upon placing the mind of the interpreter and the mind of the
individual whose belief is being identified
'in nearly enough the same realm of reason and the same
material realm' (Davidson, 1986, p.206).
In effect, the interpreter produces an acceptable interpretation of
another's belief when relying upon the same, commonly held principles of meaning as does the individual's belief-expressing assertion
itself make use of these same principles of communication and
interpretation.
Of course, it is not to be denied that errors in interpretation and
attribution are on occasion inevitable. Indeed, they may not be
infrequent. Yet to suggest that error is the rule is to adopt a pervasive skepticism that denies communication and meaning are possible
altogether. Moreover, it is not clear that it is not self-contradictory
to assert one cannot successfully interpret another's meanings, since
one's own meanings from occasion to occasion must be translatable
with on another by means of the same standards, assumptions, etc.
one uses to interpret other's meanings. The notion of an 'indeterminacy of translation', thus serves to emphasize the specific functional basis on which interpretation of meaning can generally be
said to objectively occur by indicating the fundamental role of
commonly held values, standards, and assumptions in this process.
The attnoution of interests, desires, or preferences to others is no
more nor less problematic than the attnoution to them of their
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beliefs. The suspicion that it is more difficult to interpret another's
tastes rests on the mistaken presumption that the attnoution of
belief is by comparison not problematic, that cognitive meaning is
linguistically transparent and psychologically primary, and that an
interpreter's values and standards need not play a role in the characterization of another's beliefs. Yet the attnoution of beliefs to
others is based on the ability to make interpersonal comparisons, so
that it follows that this same ability to make interpersonal comparisons makes interpretation of other's tastes possible as well, despite
the familiar problems with the practice of determining intensity of
tastes.6

In the present connection, it should again be emphasized, that what
legitimizes interpersonal utility comparisons is that the values
undeniably present in their characterization are non-discretionary
and non-normative. Normative value is discretionary in that one's
positions regarding welfare, fairness, and equity are employed to
recommend a particular use of facts to produce a particular set of
normative judgments. In contrast, the values implicit in interpretation are not discretionary in that they are constitutive of coherent
interpretation, and according are not the subject of individual
discretion. Though in practice interpretation may well smuggle in
normative value in both the interpretation of beliefs and the tastes
of others - as when it is said an account claimed as objective in fact
ideological - that this practice is characterizable as a departure from
legitimate interpretation strongly suggests that objective interpretation of other's beliefs and tastes is the rule rather than the exception.

s. Conclusion
In the second inference above, it was said that implicit in the
concept of an interpersonal comparison as a functional concept is
the notion that a successful interpersonal comparison is one that
permits the identification of net utility gains in a commodity transfer
between individuals. A successful interpersonal utility comparison,
then, depends first and foremost upon the functional value of
coDSistency in interpretation of tastes, irrespective of the individuals
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involved. It is this value - equally well understood as impartiality that ultimately justifies the recommended commodity ought to be
transferred. Thus, the descriptive premise (1) above' presupposes
that an impartial comparison of the respective utilities of Smith and
Jones for the purpose of determining a utility maximum dictates the
commodity transfer that is prescribed in the conclusions (2).
Thus evaluative propositions can be derived from descriptive ones in
economics without violating Hume's law. At the same time, the
distinction between explanation and recommendation is preserved in
economics, while the difficulties that arise in the social welfare
function framework, as a consequence of the Kemp-Ng impossibility
theorem, are surmounted by the characterization of interpersonal
utility comparisons in descriptive but value-laden terms.
Notes

1.

'In other words, SWFs (Social Welfare functions) of the
Bergson-Samuelson type are subject to impossibility results not
very different from those that apply to SWFs of the Arrow
type.'

2.

For the literature on interpersonal utility comparisons, see
Mueller (1979).

3.

Whether this is possible is discussed in the last section.

4.

See Mueller (1979, p.25S) on this emphasis.

S.

The literature is most often associated with Quine and
Davidson. See Romanos (1983) for an examination of Quine's
general influence.

6.

The construction of index numbers is methodologically problematic, yet at the same time in principle it is believed these
difficulties can be adequately surmounted. The same applies to
interpersonal utility comparisons on the argument here. Thus
problems of setting a common zero point and scale are not
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insignificant, yet not in principle obstacles the use of interpersonal utility comparisons.
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